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THE SHOULD-IT-STAY OR SHOULD-IT-GO
SPOTLIGHT:
PROTECTION OF SITE-SPECIFIC ART UNDER
VARA
I. INTRODUCTION

As long as art has existed as a form of expression for individuals
and societies, it has been the subject of controversy and heated
debates. From the subject matter to the artists' personality, from
questions over ownership to choice of placement for display, art
conjures up various feelings for various audiences. This is
especially true when the work of art is located smack dab in the
middle of our daily lives and the viewer has no choice but to gaze
upon the work. Site-specific art falls victim to this truism due to
its creation for and placement in a location specifically chosen for
the work. People often feel that site-specific art interferes with
their own thoughts of what should surround them.' The Calling is
no different.2 This orange, I-beam sculpture by Mark di Suvero3
occupied the should-it-stay or should-it-go spotlight shortly after
the Milwaukee Art Museum ("Museum") received a seventy-five

1. JoHN H. MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL
ARTS

360 (2d ed. 1987).

2. The Calling is a large monumental abstract sculpture installed at the east

end of Wisconsin Avenue in Milwaukee, WI in 1982. See Whitney Gould, In
the Way?; Di Suvero Abstract Sculpture Creatinga Stir Again, MILWAUKEE J.
SENT., Oct. 11, 2001, at lB.
3. Mark di Suvero was born in China but moved to San Francisco, California
at the beginning of World War II. He graduated from the University of
California, Berkeley in 1956 where he studied sculpture and philosophy. He
then moved to New York City and started using scrap "from demolished
buildings to create what he called "cubist, open spatial sculptures." In 1960, di
Suvero was paralyzed after we was pinned under an elevator for an hour. He is
confined to a wheel chair but learned to use an electric arc welder, cranes,
cherry pickers, and torches to create his stainless steel sculptures. See Arts on
the Point at http://www.artsonthepoint.org/disuveromark/disuvero.html (last
visited Feb. 8, 2003).
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million dollar facelift.4
In May 2001, the Museum unveiled a stunning Santiago
Calatrava5 -designed addition called the Quadracci Pavilion,
consisting of "a ninety-foot high glass-walled reception hall
enclosed by the Burke Brise Soleil," a movable sunscreen
sculpture.6 The Pavilion is constructed of white concrete, glass,
white Carrera marble and maple wood floors.7

One journalist

captured the essence of the creation by stating that "to watch this
kinetic sculpture unfold, to see its white steel fins rise from a
steeply pitched, glass-walled reception hall and then turn into a
pair of softly curving arcs that suggest a bird taking flight, is to
witness a thing of pure, exhilarating joy."8 The addition also
includes a suspended pedestrian bridge, supported by a leaning
mast and steel cables, which reaches out "like an arm extended to

4. See Anthony S. Busalacchi, Public Art; Find Right Place for I-beam
Sculpture, MILWAUKEE J. SENT., Oct. 23, 2001, at 12A. See also James Auer,
The di Suvero dilemma: An Ideal Match or HorribleDetraction?, MILWAUKEE
at
2001,
available
Oct.
18,
J.
SENT.,
(last
http://www.jsonline.com/onwisconsin/arts/oct01/suvlede 18101701 .asp
visited Feb. 13, 2003).
5. Santiago Calatrava is a Spanish architect and civil engineer. He received a
Ph.D. in 1979 from the Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich. Calatrava
then began accepting engineering commissions and entering competitions. He
is known internationally for designing and building bridges, as well as other
large-scale public projects including railway stations, an opera house, and an
airport. The Milwaukee Art Museum addition is Calatrava's first building in the
website
at
Art
Museum
See
Milwaukee
United
States.
http://www.mam.org/site/biography.asp (last visited Feb. 13, 2003).
at
Museum
website
Art
6. See
Milwaukee
http://www.mam.org/sitefbuildingfuture.asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2003).
7. Id. See the Milwaukee Art Museum website for additional information
regarding the size of the addition and the materials used, available at
http://www.mam.org/site/funfacts.asp (last visited Feb. 13, 2003).
8. See Blair Kamin, Winged Victory, Spanish Architect's Sleek Sunshade
adds an Exclamation Point to Milwaukee's Lakefront Art Museum, CHI. TRIB.,
Oct. 21, 2001. The journalist, an architecture critic, also stated that "the
addition so successfully combines the sleek and the sensual, the futuristic and
the primitive, machined forms and those that are free-flowing and organic, that
one can still rave abut its dazzling synthesis of space, light and structure." Id.
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the city,"9 connecting the museum to Wisconsin Avenue."°
Calatrava wanted to add something to the lakefront instead of to
the building and describes the addition as "a kind of pavilion,
transparent and light, which contrasts with the massive, compact"
museum building.'
The Calling was installed in 1982 at the east end of Wisconsin
Avenue. 2 The large, steel, "boldly geometric"' 3 sculpture has been
described in a number of ways, including a "bold orange
sunburst,"' 4 and an "orange star." 5 However, The Calling now sits
in front of the Calatrava addition. It is not a surprise that these two
contrasting works formed the basis for heated discussion regarding
the future of the site-specific sculpture.
The surrounding
community let their voices be heard.
As natural to any
controversy, people presented strong arguments both for and
against any move of the sculpture. One resident argued for "the
City of Milwaukee to remove that pile of scrap iron [The Calling]
blocking the view of the beautiful new Milwaukee Art Museum."' 6
On the other hand, one journalist argued that the two works
enhance each other while "the great wings atop the Quadracci
Pavilion frame and set off di Suvero's big-scale work, to their
mutual benefit."' 7 There were still others who argued that even
though The Calling is a respectable piece of sculpture, it no longer

9. See Architect Santiago Calatrava on the Milwaukee Art Museum website,
available at http://www.mam.org/site/biography.asp (last visited Feb. 13, 2003).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See Gould, supra note 2, at 01B.
13. See James Auer, No Need for Calatrava- di Suvero Fuss, MILWAUKEE J.
SENT.,
Oct.
24,
2001,
available
at

http://www.jsonline.com/onwisconsin/arts/octOI/auerco124102301 a.asp
(last
visited Feb. 13, 2003).
14. Id.
15. See Nahal Toosi, There's a Calling Not to Move Sculpture, MILWAUKEE
J. SENT., Oct. 11,2001, at 02A.
16. See Crossroads, Lakefront's New Look, MILWAUKEE J. SENT., Oct. 14,
2001, at 05J (statement by Milt Scholl Pewaukee).
17. See Auer, supra note 4.
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fits with the new addition as a backdrop and should be moved.18
However, from an artistic standpoint, the decision of whether to
move the sculpture so as not to interfere with the million-dollar
renovation should not be based on anyone's opinion but the
artist's. At the height of the controversy in October of 2001, the
museum's executive director stated that the opinions at the
museum were not relevant and that the museum needed to respect
the artist's wishes. Even Calatrava himself stated it is "the right of
the artist to decide whether the sculpture should stay or go. ' 9
Even though a number of publications regarding the heated
situation reported that di Suvero was to visit Milwaukee to discuss
the future of the sculpture, nothing has been reported to confirm
any visit or any final decision.20
This article uses the above sculpture-architecture controversy as
a backdrop for an analysis of legal protection for site-specific
artwork. The article discusses possible ways to protect the artist
and the sculpture, while focusing on moral rights and the Visual
Artist Rights Act ("VARA"). Part II of this article provides
relevant background information regarding past and current
protection of moral rights in the United States. This section also
discusses the interplay between moral rights and site-specific
artwork. Part III provides an analysis of the current situation and
addresses the question of whether The Calling, as a site-specific
18. See Busalacchi, supra note 4, at 12A. Anthony S. Busalacchi concluded
that "the di Suvero must be moved, because it has lost its backdrop of lake and
sky with the changing blues, grays and whites that I felt were part of the work"
and argued to give "it a new home that returns a similar backdrop." The
statement that the sky and the lake are part of the work strengthens the argument
that site-specific art receives its essence from its surroundings. Additionally,
this statement raises an important question of whether permitting the addition to
be built and, therefore, interfere with and take away from the meaning of the
sculpture, violates di Suvero's moral rights in the first place.
19. See Auer, supra note 4.
20. See Auer, supra note 4; see Cheryl Swack, Safeguarding Artistic
Creation and the Cultural Heritage: A Comparison of Droit Moral Between
Franceand the United States, 21 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 361 (1998) Gould,
supra note 2; see James Auer, Reader's Verdict Clear: 'Move di Suvero Now,
MILWAUKEE J. SENT., Oct. 25, 2001.
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sculpture, may gain protection under VARA. This article will also
briefly discuss alternative theories of protection. Unfortunately,
this paper concludes that the law, as it is now, provides little or no
protection for The Calling.

II.BACKGROUND

A. Moral Rights
Moral rights come from the French term droit moral and refer to
the inherent and natural rights an author has in a created work.2
The idea is that an artist's personality and feelings become part of
the work through the creative process and may never be separated
from the work. Part of the author is left in the creation and vice
versa; the work is the artist's "spiritual child."22 These rights
include the right of attribution and the right of integrity.23 The
right of attribution includes the right to have one's name on one's
creation or to have one's name removed if the work is mutilated
and fails to continue as the author's original creation.24 The right
of integrity focuses on the right to not have one's creation
mutilated or destroyed.
The continent of Europe readily
recognizes these rights above and beyond any economical rights an
author may have.25 However, in the United States, moral rights
21.

PATTY GERSTENBLITH,

Law,

ART AND THE CULTURAL HERITAGE, ch. 4,

1 (forthcoming 2004).
22. See Cheryl Swack, Safeguarding Artistic Creation and the Cultural
Heritage: A Comparison of Droit Moral between Franceand The United States,
22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 361, 361 (1998).
23. 17 U.S.C. § 106A; see also GERSTENBLITH, supra note 21.

24. Id.
25. For further discussion regarding international protection of moral rights,
see Vera Zlatarski, "Moral" Rights and Other Moral Interests: Public Art Law
in France, Russia, and the United States, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 201,
201 (1999) (stating French copyright law provides for both an economic right
and a non-economic right, which "is seen as 'an emanation of manifestation of
her personality'); see Swack, supra note 22 (dealing specifically with moral
rights and public art).
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take a back seat to pecuniary rights.
1. Protection of Moral Rights Priorto VARA
Before the United States enacted VARA and there was no
statutory grant of protection based on moral rights, courts either
refused to protect these rights or were reluctant to protect these
rights.2 6 However, some courts indirectly provided protection for
moral rights under alternative theories. In Gilliam v. American
Broadcasting Co.,2" Monty Python, a British comedy group,
claimed that ABC violated its right of integrity by mutilating its
program through extensive editing. The court relied on § 43(a) of
the Lanham Act to find misrepresentation and unfair competition
because the program was no longer fairly considered the plaintiffs
work after editing. The court stated that "to deform [the artist's]
work is to present [the artist] to the public as the creator of a work
not his own, and thus makes him subject to criticism for work he
has not done."28 Therefore, the court did not expressly provide
26. See Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947) (stating
that "the conception of "moral rights" of authors so fully recognized and
developed in the civil law countries has not yet received acceptance in the law
of the United States. No such right is referred to by legislation, court decision
or writers."). This case focused on the right of attribution. A photographer
brought suit against a publisher claiming that the publication of plaintiffs
photographs without his signature violated his right to receive credit and that the
same constituted a misrepresentation as representing the works to be that of an
other. Id. at 524. The court held for the publisher because moral rights did not
exist in the United States and stated that the court was not available to establish
any new law in this area. Id. at 526.
Additionally, the court in Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 89 N.Y.S.2d
813 (1949), failed to recognize moral rights where the plaintiff artist brought
suit in response to the destruction of a mural he painted that was attached to the
The church received numerous complaints
wall of defendant's church.
eventually painted over during redecoration
which
was
regarding the mural,
without notice to the plaintiff. The court denied the existence of the artist's
right of integrity and stated that any right must be reserved in writing between
the parties.
27. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
28. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24 (quoting Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Rights,
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protection for the plaintiffs work due to violation of moral rights
but indirectly protected the plaintiffs moral rights under
trademark law. Technically, "the court did not vindicate the
artists' right to control the future of their creations but rather the
public's right
to be properly informed of the nature and origin of
29
the work.

2. Protection of Moral Rights Under VARA
VARA is the United States' attempt to incorporate moral rights
into statutory law. The United States joined the Berne Convention
in 1988 to achieve greater international protection for intellectual
property. Article 6bis of the Berne Convention protects the rights
of integrity and attribution by providing: "(1) [I]ndependently of
the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said
rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the
work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other
modification, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said
work, which would be prejudicial to his honour or reputation."3
The Berne Convention requires that protection must last as long as
the artist's economic rights. 3"
To achieve compliance with the Berne Convention, Congress
enacted the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, which is codified in
the Copyright Act.32 Rights provided by VARA only extend to
works of visual art. A work of visual art is defined in section 101
of the Copyright Act and includes "a painting, drawing, print, or
sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited edition of 200
copies or fewer that are signed by the author ...

53

HARV. L. REV. 554, 569 (1940)).
29. See GERSTENBLITH, supra note 21, ch. 4 at 13.

30. Berne Convention, art. 6bis, § 1 (Paris Act 1971).
31. See GERSTENBLITH, supra note 21, ch. 4 at 19.
32. VARA can be found in 17 U.S.C. §§ 106A.
33. The entire definition states:
A "work of visual art" is - (1)a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing
in a single copy, in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and
consecutively numbered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple
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The rights granted by VARA include the right of attribution and
integrity. Section 106A(a) states:
that the author of a work of visual art (1) shall have the right (A) to claim authorship of that work, and (B) to prevent the use of
his or her name as the author of any work of visual art which he or
she did not create; (2) shall have the right to prevent the use of his
or her name as the author of the work of visual art in the event of a
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work which
would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation; and (3) ...
shall have the right - (A) to prevent any intentional distortion,
mutilation, or other modification of that work which would be
prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation, and any intentional
distortion, mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation of
that right, and (B) to prevent any destruction of a work of
recognized stature, and any intentional or grossly negligent
destruction of that work is a violation of that right.34
However, protection under VARA only lasts for the life of the
author.35 VARA is not retroactive and only applies to works of
visual art created on or after the effective date of the statute, June
1, 1991, and "to works created prior to the statute's effective date
but title to which has not, as of such effective date, been

cases, carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively
numbered by the author and bear the signature or other identifying mark of the
author; or (2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only,
existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition of
200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author.
The section also includes a negative definition of what a work of visual art does
not include.
34. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a). The statute continues to set forth the scope and
exercise of rights, exceptions to protection, duration of rights, and transfer and
waiver of rights. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106A(b), (c), (d), and (e).
35. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d). This duration is arguably in violation of the
requirements set forth by the Berne Convention that moral rights must last as
long as the duration of economic rights. In the United States, the duration of
economic rights received from copyright protection lasts for the life of the
author plus seventy years. Therefore, the durations of these rights are in conflict
between the two granting bodies.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol13/iss1/5
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transferred from the author."3 6 The following summarizes the
small number of cases that have been brought under VARA.
37

i. Carterv. Helmsley-Spear, Inc.

In Carter, three artists brought an action to prevent alteration of
artwork installed by them in the lobby of a commercial building.
The artists entered into an agreement with the building lessee to
"design, create and install sculpture and other permanent
installations" in the building and the lobby.38 The artwork was a
walk-through sculpture consisting of sculptural elements
representing environmental concerns and recycling.39 However,
the building's lease was terminated and the building was
surrendered to the building owner and management company. At
that time, the artists were told that they could no longer install
artwork on the property and that the artwork already in place
would likely be removed.4"
After a long discussion regarding VARA and the moral rights
protected by the statute, the court held that the sculpture was a
work made for hire and therefore not protected under VARA. 4 1 In
making this decision, the court looked at a number of factors to
determine whether the artists were employees, causing the
sculpture to be a work made for hire, or whether the artists were
independent contractors. Even though the artists retained complete
artistic freedom with respect to the sculpture's creation, the work
was made for hire because the management company had a right to
and did assign other duties to the artists, employee benefits and tax
treatment of the artists indicated employee status, and the artists
were provided with many supplies in creating the sculpture. 2
36. Moakley v. Eastwick, 666 N.E.2d 505, 510 (1996); see Carter v.
Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 1995).
37. 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995).
38. Id. at 80.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 81.
41. Id. at 87-88.
42. Id. at 86-87. The court in Community for Creative Non- Violence v. Reid,
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43
ii. Martin v. City of Indianapolis

The only case brought under VARA and analyzed by the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals is Martin v. City of Indianapolis.
In this case, the artist brought suit under VARA for the city's
destruction of the artist's sculpture. The large outdoor stainless
steel sculpture was located on property that was later acquired by
the city as part of an urban renewal project and demolished
without notice to the artist. 44
The court stated that in order to protect a work of visual art from
destruction, the work must be a recognized stature, a term that is
not defined in the act. The court used the two-prong stature test
set forth in Carter, which requires "(1) that the visual art in
question has "stature," i.e. is viewed as meritorious, and (2) that
this stature is "recognized" by art experts, other members of the45
artistic community, or by some cross-section of society.
Although the artist did not present expert testimony, the court
allowed the test to be satisfied by newspaper and magazine articles
and various letters because they were used to show that the
sculpture had not gone unnoticed instead of being offered for the
truth of what they asserted. 46 Additionally, under the agreement
between the city and the artist, the city had a duty to give notice
prior to destruction, which they failed to do.47 Therefore, the court
490 U.S. 730 (1989), set forth a multi-factor balancing test to determine is a
work was made for hire by an employee or made by an independent contractor.
However, the court in Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992),
established five factors which would be relevant in nearly all cases. The
appellate court in Carter focused on these five factors, which include "the right
to control the manner and means of production; requisite skill; provision of
employee benefits; tax treatment of the hired party; [and] whether the hired
party may be assigned additional projects." Carter,77 F.3d at 86.
43. 192 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 1999).
44. Id. at611.
45. Id. at 612.
46. Id. at 612-13. The city argued that the evidence introduced by the artist
to prove recognized stature was inadmissible hearsay. Id.
47. Id. at 613-14. The city also argued that the artist waived his rights under
VARA by signing the project agreement. The court stated that although "an
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held that the surprise destruction of the artist's sculpture was a
violation of VARA and awarded the artist statutory damages.
iii. Pollarav. Seymour48
In this case, the artist, Pollara, brought suit under VARA based
on the defendant's destruction of a mural she created. Pollara was
hired by a public interest group to create a painting to be displayed
as part of a lobbying effort to protest against legal aid funding
cuts.49 The mural was created on heavy photographic paper and
affixed to a metal frame for display. Pollara installed the painting
but it was removed prior to public viewing and, in the process, the
Later, the rips were
mural was ripped into three sections."
repaired and taped to the wall for display at the event.
The court stated that to maintain a claim under VARA, the artist
must show that "(1) the destroyed work was a "work of visual art"
and a "work of recognized stature"; and (2) the destruction of [the]
When
work was either intentional or grossly negligent."'"
determining whether a work was of recognized stature, the court
used the same two-prong test set forth in Carter. However, the
court did not decide if the work was actually of recognized stature
because the mural was never publicly displayed and therefore
could not gain recognized stature. The court relied on the fact that
the mural was "intended to be displayed on a one-time, short-term
basis. 52 Additionally, Pollara did not intend to preserve the work
for future display or retain any lasting value.53 Therefore, the court
artist may waive VARA rights in a written instrument signed by the author,
specifying to what the waiver applies," there was no written waiver instrument
in this case. Martin, 192 F.3d at 614.
48. 206 F. Supp. 2d 333 (N.D.N.Y. 2002).

49. Id. at 334. The public interest group who hired Pollara was the New
York State Defenders Association ("NYSDA") and the protest was to be done
by the Gideon Coalition. Id.
50. Id. at 335.
51. Id. at 336.
52. Id. at 335.
53. Pollara,206 F.Supp.2d at 337. The court stated "the fact that the mural
was not intended to have any lasting value is evidenced by her admission that
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held that the mural was not of recognized stature due to its short
viewing life and thus was not protected under VARA.
3. Moral Rights and Site-Specific Art
If a work of art is site-specific, additional problems may arise
when seeking protection under VARA. "Site-specific art is art
whose placement in a three-dimensional context is integral to the
expression and meaning of the art work itself."54 The work is
"conceived and created in relation to the particular conditions of a
specific site."55 "The Calling is a site-specific work, designed,
crafted and placed for maximum effect in a particular spot ....
[I]t exploits the shoreline to the east, the skyline to the west."56
i. Serra v. United States GeneralServices Administration57
In this situation, Serra, the artist, contracted with the General
Services Administration of the Federal Government to create a
work of art for the Federal Plaza at Foley Square in Manhattan. 8
Tilted Arc, the formalist and minimalist sculpture, was installed in
1981 . The slightly curved sculpture, created from a slab of steel,
was 120 feet long and twelve feet high and bisected the plaza.6"
The sculpture was immediately disliked and subject to hostility
from those who worked and lived in the area. 6 After the GSA
held public hearings, it was determined that the sculpture was to be
she suffered no financial injury as a result of its destruction, and also because
there was no evidence that any of plaintiffs other similar murals had ever been
permanently preserved for display." Id.
54. See GERSTENBLITH, supra note 21, ch. 4 at 12.
55. See Eric M. Brooks, "Tilted" Justice: Site-Specific Art and Moral Rights
after U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, 77 CAL. L.R. 1431, 1432 (1989).
56. See Auer, supra note 4.
57. 664 F. Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), as amended, 667 F. Supp. 1042, aff'd,
847 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1988).
58. Serra, 667 F. Supp. at 1044.
59. See Brooks, supra note 55, at 1431.
60. Id.
61. See MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 1, at 360.
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removed and relocated. Serra filed suit to prevent the destruction
of the work basing his claim on the first amendment freedom of
expression.6 2 However, this argument was rejected by the district
court and affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
Serra raised new legal arguments based on the United State's
adherence to the Berne Convention. However, he abandoned this
argument when his attorneys advised him that neither the Berne
Convention nor the implementing act would protect the sculpture.63
The only success Serra encountered was "in preventing the reinstallation of the sculpture in another location because a panel of
art experts unanimously concluded that the sculpture was sitespecific and therefore could not be displayed elsewhere without
destroying its artistic integrity and intent."'
III. ANALYSIS
This section analyzes the arguments available to di Suvero if a
suit should arise from this sculpture/architecture controversy.
Next, this section analyzes the facts to conclude that the sculpture
is not protected under VARA. This section then discusses other
possible forms of protection for the sculpture and concludes that
the common law does not provide protection for the artist and the
sculpture.
Arguments
If the Museum decided to move the sculpture to obtain a full and
uninterrupted view of the new Calatrava addition, di Suvero may
want to protect the sculpture. There may be a number of possible
theories of protection. The artist would most likely argue violation
of the right of integrity to either prohibit the move or to sue for
damages after any move. The United State's greatest, although
arguably weak, protection of visual art is provided by VARA.

62. See Brooks, supra note 55, at 1432; Serra, 664 F. Supp. at 801.
63. See Brooks, supra note 55, at 1433.

64. See GERSTENBLITH, supra note 21, ch. 4 at 12.
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Therefore, the artist would seek protection under VARA for this
right of integrity.
Additionally, the artist may argue under
alternative theories of protection including contract, copyright, and
trademark.
A. The Calling not protected under VARA
If di Suvero seeks protection under VARA, he will not be able
to prevent the Museum from moving the sculpture.
This
disappointing, but not totally unexpected conclusion, is the result
of one small but detrimental provision in the statute that severely
limits the protection provided to visual art in this country. VARA
only protects works of visual art that are created on or after the
effective date of the statute, which is June 1, 1991. The Calling
was installed in 1982. Therefore, the sculpture cannot even
receive protection under VARA, the country's foremost protection
of moral rights, just because of the date of its creation.
However, even putting aside this unfortunate limitation and after
an analysis of the rest of the statute, the sculpture probably would
not be protected by VARA even if it was created on or after June
1, 1991. This conclusion is the result of one narrow provision and
the reality of site-specific art. The first main issue when analyzing
these facts under VARA is whether the moving of a site-specific
artwork deforms, mutilates, modifies or destroys the artwork. This
is an issue because whether the artwork will be deformed,
mutilated, modified, or destroyed is essential to invoking the
protections offered by the statute. Those protections preserve an
author's right of attribution, right of integrity, and with works that
are of a recognized stature, the right to prevent destruction, which
is part of the right of integrity.
The right of integrity allows the artist to prevent any deforming
or mutilating changes to his work.65 VARA protects the right of
integrity by stating that the artist has the right "to prevent any
intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that
work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or

65.

Carter, 71 F.3d at 81.
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reputation."66 As a result, the question becomes whether moving a
site-specific sculpture deforms or mutilates the work, or qualifies
as a modification allowed under the statute. No court has analyzed
VARA in this way; the few cases where courts analyze VARA
deal with the destruction of a work and of the statutory
requirement of proving 'recognized stature.' Additionally, the
statute is silent on the issue for it does not provide definitions for
these terms.67 Even when looking at dictionary definitions of these
terms, the issue is not solved for the real issue is how do these
terms legally relate to the nature of site-specific artwork.
Distort is defined as "to twist out of the true meaning ... to twist

out of a natural, normal, or original shape or condition."68 Mutilate
is defined as "to cut up or alter radically so as to make
imperfect."69 The definition of modify must also be analyzed for
the statute states an artist may protect the artwork from any "other
modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her
honor or reputation."7 Modify is defined as "to make minor
changes in the form or structure of; alter without transforming...
to make a basic or important change." 7 ' Although, the terms are
now defined, the question remains as to how they are applied to
site-specific artwork.
1. Moving of Site-Specific Artwork Probablynot Seen as
Destruction
For a site-specific artwork to be protected under these terms, it
must be argued from an artistic and creative standpoint that
moving a site-specific work distorts, mutilates, or modifies the
work due to its reliance on its surroundings to define and be the
essence of the meaning of the work. This argument was used in
response to the Richard Serra controversy, which ended in a
66. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2).
67. See 17 U.S.C. § 101.

68. WEBSTER'S
69. Id. at 1493.

THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

659 (1981).

70. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2).

71.

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
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removal of his sculpture from the plaza where it was installed,
when "a panel of experts unanimously concluded that the sculpture
was site-specific and therefore could not be displayed elsewhere
without destroying its artistic integrity and intent."72 Even though
this states that moving a site-specific artwork destroys its artistic
integrity, it is doubtful any court would equate this with the term
destroy as used in VARA. This is evident from the use of the term
destroy by the courts in the few available cases.
The court in Carter held that the artists could not prevent the
removal of the sculpture, which would result in its destruction or
alteration, because the sculpture was a work made for hire and
hence not protected under VARA.73 It may be argued that the
sculpture in Carter constituted site-specific sculpture because it
was created for a particular space, the lobby of the building, and
was incorporated into the building as a single, interrelated work.
The building lobby and the incorporated surroundings were an
integral part to the expression and meaning of the work itself.
However, because the court decided the sculpture was a work
made for hire and not protected, the court did not delineate exactly
what would happen to the sculpture when it was moved, i.e. be
destroyed or altered.
However, those facts can be compared with the ones at issue
here. Even though the sculpture in Carter arguably was sitespecific, parts of the sculpture were attached to and incorporated
into the building. Therefore, any removal of the work would cause
part of the sculpture to be removed from the building, in itself
destroying part of the sculpture. The sculpture is not in the same
form it would be after it is removed because part of the sculpture,
the building, will be missing. Here, The Calling is not attached to
a building but stands by itself, allowing it to be moved without
disrupting the actual sculpture. As a result, it can be argued that
no damage will occur to The Calling than what happened to the
sculpture in Carterand hence, is not a destruction of the work.
In Martin, the sculpture was destroyed because it was

72. See GERSTENBLITH, supra note 21, ch. 4 at 12.
73. Carter,71 F.3d at 88.
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demolished. The sculpture ceased to exist in its original state, the
metal being mangled by a machine. That is not what will happen
here. If The Calling is moved, the work of art, the pieces of metal
itself, will not be harmed. The work will remain as a whole piece
and it will just be placed somewhere else. Therefore, a court will
not see the move as a destruction of the sculpture.
In Pollara, the work of art was destroyed when the mural was
ripped in three different places. Again, this is not what will
happen to The Calling. The sculpture itself, the steel beams, will
not be crushed, bent, cut in half, or any other possible destruction.
It will stay exactly the same; the work will just be moved.
Therefore, a court will most likely not see the moving of a sitespecific sculpture that does not harm the actual physical work
itself, as a destruction of the work. Consequently, The Calling
must be seen as distorted, mutilated or modified to be protected
under the statute.
2. Moving of Site-Specific Artwork Probably not Seen as
Distortion or Mutilation
When looking at the definitions set forth above, the sculpture
will probably not be seen as distorted because it is neither being
"twisted out of shape" nor will a move "change the usual shape or
appearance of' the sculpture. As just analyzed, the moving of a
site-specific sculpture does not change the actual physical parts of
the sculpture, just its surroundings. Likewise, a court is not likely
to see the moving of the sculpture as a mutilation because it will
not be damaged or injured. However, it may be argued that
moving a site-specific sculpture from its intended surroundings
amounts to making the sculpture imperfect, by removing an
essential part of the work. However, this may be a stretch from the
literal dictionary definitions and a court will likely concentrate on
the physical work itself and not the conceptualized surroundings
when analyzing site-specific work under the sculpture.
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3. Moving of Site-Specific Artwork Probably Seen as a
Modification
The best bet for the sculpture to gain protection under VARA is
the argument that moving the sculpture is a modification that
would be prejudicial to the artist's honor or reputation. Moving
the sculpture, even though the actual physical work is not changed,
is at the very least a modification of the sculpture because it is
moved from its original and conceptual surroundings. But the next
part of the definition may prove crucial because this modification
needs to be prejudicial to the artist's honor or reputation. Here,
again, one needs to examine whether the moving of a site-specific
work from its intended surroundings to a new context is prejudicial
to the artist's honor reputation.
Obviously, by its very definition, a site-specific work relies on
its surrounding for its meaning and expression. Artists and
advocates of the art world would argue that moving a cite-specific
work modifies a work of art to the point of being prejudicial to the
artist's honor or reputation. The work of art is a product of the
artist and part of the artist's personality stays with the work. With
site-specific artwork, the artist created an object to fit in a
particular setting, for a particular reason, and to draw on particular
emotions. Therefore, because part of the artist stays with the
sculpture that has been placed where it is for a reason, moving the
sculpture would be prejudicial to the artist's honor. If this issue
were to find itself before a court, the art advocate can only hope
that the court understands and appreciates the essence of sitespecific art.
None withstanding the above analysis, site-specific art faces a
bigger obstacle regarding a provision found in VARA. Section
106A(c)(2) states that "the modification of a work of visual art
which is the result of conservation, or of the public presentation,
including lighting and placement, of the work is not a destruction,
distortion, mutilation, or other modification."74 It may be argued
that the moving of The Calling is a modification of the public

74. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(2).
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presentation because it is a simple change in placement and
therefore not protected under VARA. The response to this
argument goes back to the same argument seen above. If the work
was created for a specific surrounding and the meaning of the
work is based on those surroundings, the artist's chosen public
presentation of the work is where it is because that is where the
work was created to reside. Therefore, by changing the placement
of the artwork, the whole meaning of the work changes and it is no
longer the same sculpture with the same expression. Therefore,
the move is not for public presentation because the sculpture is
where it is for a specific presentation and if it is moved the purpose
of the presentation is changed and thus does not fall under this
provision.
In any case, preventing a move of The Calling under VARA
proves to be an impossible task due to the effective date of the
statute. But even if the sculpture was created on or after June 1,
1991, and hence available for protection, the issue is raised as to
whether the moving of a site-specific artwork is a destruction,
distortion, mutilation, or modification that is prejudicial to the
artist's reputation or honor. Section 106A(c)(2) is also a high
hurdle for site-specific art to jump in order to gain protection under
VARA. The main argument a lawyer must raise before a court
deciding these issues is that the whole essence and meaning of a
site-specific artwork is based on its surroundings and that any
change in the whole creation, the sculpture as well as the setting,
affects both the expression of the work as well as the artist's honor
and reputation.
B. Alternative Theories of Protection
Before Congress enacted VARA, courts protected moral rights
in varying fashions by disguising the concept in theories like
"copyright, unfair competition, invasion of privacy, defamation,
and breach of contract."75 As a result, the artist in this situation
may attempt to protect The Calling under one of these theories.

75. Carter,71 F.3d at 82.
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This section will focus on three possible alternative theories
including contract, copyright and trademark.
1. ContractTheory
Di Suvero may be able to protect his sculpture under contract
law. Because the museum owns the piece76 and it was installed
approximately twenty year ago, it is unlikely that di Suvero or the
Museum contracted on how to handle this issue. However, di
Suvero may be protected if he contracted to retain this right
regarding placement or moving the sculpture. More facts need to
be known about the original and ongoing contractual relationship
between the artist and the Museum before this may be determined.
2. Copyright Theory
The artist may be able to protect his work under copyright law
but this protection depends on who owns the bundle of rights
offered by copyright law. However, the Museum owns the actual
artwork itself and can probably move it without violating any right
based in copyright the artist may still retain. This is due to the fact
that the copyrighted work is separate from the copyright itself.
Therefore, the owner can probably do what they wish to the actual
work under copyright law.
3. Trademark Theory
Theoretically, this may be a better match for protection in the
current situation. The court in Gilliam relied on § 43(a) of the
Lanham act to find misrepresentation and unfair competition
because the television program was no longer fairly considered the
artist's work after the extensive editing. The court stated that "to
deform [the artist's] work is to present [the artist] to the public as
the creator of a work not his own, and thus makes him subject to
criticism for work he has not done." In the situation at hand, di
76. See Gould, supra note 2, at lB.
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Suvero may have to show that any moving of the sculpture would
deform the work. This is the same issue that arose in the VARA
analysis and is harder to show here than in the Gil/iam case. An
argument might be that the audience of the sculpture would still
know it was created by di Suvero, even if it is moved, because the
physical work itself is still the same. In contrast, the program in
the Gilliam case was physically changed as a result of over-editing
and the removal of a significant amount of footage and material.
Therefore, di Suvero will have a hard time gaining protection
under trademark law unless the court understands the essence of
site-specific art.
V. CONCLUSION

Even though this is a cut and dry issue for di Suvero, due to the
effective date of the statute, this is not a cut and dry issue for sitespecific work in general. If a work is available to receive
protection under VARA, there are a number of hurdles to cross
before an artist will reach victory. The nature of site-specific art
raises a number of issues while searching for protection under
VARA including, whether the moving of a site-specific artwork
destroys, distorts, mutilates or modifies the artwork. These terms
are not defined in the statute and even with the help of dictionary
definitions, it is not clear how these terms legally apply to the
nature of site-specific artwork. Any protection a court may grant
to site-specific artwork will most likely be based in conceptual and
theoretical understandings of the artwork's reliance on its
surroundings for essence and meaning. There are alternative
theories of protection that courts have used in the past. However,
it is clear that these theories do not protect moral rights to the
extent that will protect the moving of a s ite-specific artwork.
Unfortunately, di Suvero may be out of luck.

Rebecca J. Martel
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